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REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS
UNDER THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT
JERRY IV. MARKHAM*
INTRODUCTION
N recent years there has been increasing governmental interest in
foreign commercial participation in commodity futures contracts,'
traded on United States contract markets, 2 and in other related
transactions. This interest has been aroused because deceptive and
manipulative practices in trading futures contracts can be employed as
effectively by foreign participants as by domestic participants, and
such acts may directly affect the United States economy. 3 A principal
objective of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) is to preclude such
practices, 4  and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
* B.S. 1969, Western Kentucky University; J.D. 1971, University of Kentucky- LL.M. 1974,
Georgetown University. Mr. Markham was formerly Chief Counsel for the Division of Enforce-
ment of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.
1. "A futures contract is a legally binding commitment to deliver or take delivery of a given
quantity and quality of a commodity, at a price agreed upon when the contract is made, with
delivery at the seller's option sometime during the specified future delivery month." Chicago
Board of Trade, Commodity Trading Manual 8 (1973); see Commodity Futures Trading
Commission, Glossary of Some Terms Commonly Used in the Futures Trading Industry 13
(1978). See generally Clark, Genealogy and Genetics of "Contract of Sale of a Commodity For
Future Delivery" in the Commodity Exchange Act, 27 Emory L.J. 1175 (1978).
2. Futures contracts may be traded on boards of trade designated as "contract markets" by
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) when such boards of trade have met
requirements designed to insure that the contract markets will regulate the activities of their
members. 7 U.S.C. § 7 (1976). See generally 44 Fed. Reg. 13,494 (1979); Markham & Schobel,
Commodity Exchange Rule Approval-Procedural Mishmash or Antitrust Umbrella?, Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) (Special Supp.) (No. 746, Jan. 13, 1976); Markham & Schobel,
Sef-Regulation Under the Commodity Exchange Act-Can the CFTC Make It Work?, Sec. Reg.
& L. Rep. (BNA) (Special Supp.) (No. 368, Sept. 1, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Self-Regulation];
Schneider, The CFTC: Initial Actions and Future Priorities, 27 Ad. L. Rev. 369, 373-75 (1975).
The Commodity Exchange Act prohibits commodity futures transactions except through a
member of a contract market. 7 U.S.C. §§ 6, 6h (1976).
3. S. Rep. No. 850, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in [1978] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
2087, 2097. For a discussion of manipulation cases under the Commodity Exchange Act see
Campbell, Trading in Futures Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 26 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 215,
233-47 (1958); Hieronymus, Manipulation in Commodity Futures Trading: Toward a Definition,
6 Hofstra Lo Rev. 41 (1977); Schief & Markham, The Nation's "Commodity Cops"-Efforts by the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission to Etforce the Commodity Exchange Act, 34 Bus. Law.
19, 34-39 (1978).
4. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-17a (1976). One of the most important provisions of the CEA as originally
enacted was that it made price manipulation a criminal offense. Commodity Exchange Act, ch.
545, §§ 2, 11, 49 Stat. 1491, 1501 (1936) (current version at 7 U.S.C. § 13 (1976)). Prior to the
enactment of the CEA, commodity transactions were governed by the Grain Futures Act of 1922
(the Act). Act of Sept. 21, 1922, ch. 369, 42 Stat. 998. The Act provided for a federal licensing
system pursuant to which the exchanges were required to obtain federal designation as contract
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(CFTC),5 the agency which presently administers the CEA, 6 has
issued regulations designed to assure strict federal control of trading in
commodity futures contracts. 7 It is not always clear, however, whether
and to what extent the CEA and CFTC regulations apply to interna-
tional transactions.
In 1974, in creating the CFTC, Congress substantially amended the
CEA.8 One of the principal considerations behind this amendment, the
markets in each commodity on which futures were traded. A condition for such designation was
that contract markets regulate their members' conduct to prevent market price manipulation. The
Act, however, dealt only with the exchanges, and not with individual traders. If an exchange
failed to regulate its members, therefore, the government's only recourse was to suspend or
revoke its designation. As a practical matter, however, such action could not be taken because of
the economic chaos that would ensue. S. Rep. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in
[1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5843, 5854-55. The Agriculture Department, pursuant to
powers derived from the Act, conducted investigations into market activities, Id. at 14, reprinted
in [1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 5855. These investigations "pointed to the sources and
patterns of excessive speculation and price manipulation, and clearly showed that the limited
regulatory powers authorized [by the Act] were inadequate in dealing with these and other market
abuses." Id., reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 5855. The enactment of the
CEA was the congressional response to these findings.
5. The CFTC has exclusive jurisdiction over all futures transactions, commodity options, and
certain leverage transactions. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1976); see CFTC Interpretative Letter No. 77-2,
reprinted in [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,257 (Jan. 14, 1977),
CFTC Interpretative Letters Nos. 76-19, 76-20, reprinted in [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,213, 20,214 (Sept. 29, 1976); [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut.
L. Rep. (CCH) 20,117 (Nov. 13, 1975). See generally Bromberg, Commodities Law and
Securities Law-Overlaps and Preemptions, I J. Corp. L. 217 (1976); Johnson, The Commodity
Futures Trading Commission Act: Preemption as Public Policy, 29 Vand. L. Rev. 1 (1976);
Lower, State Enforcement of the Commodity Exchange Act, 27 Emory L.J. 1057 (1978); Russo &
Lyon, Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 6 Hofstra L. Rev.
57 (1977). The Futures Trading Act of 1978 amended the CEA to permit the states to investigate
violations and to bring injunctive actions. Public Law No. 95-405, 92 Stat. 865, 872-73 (1978); see
Metals Depository Corp. v. Abrams, 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. 20,787 (Sup. Ct. 1979).
6. Before the CFTC was created, the CEA was administered by the Commodity Exchange
Commission, composed of the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Commerce, and the
Attorney General. Commodity Exchange Act, ch. 545, § 3(b), 49 Stat. 1491 (1936). The
Commission was authorized "to curb excessive speculation by the large market operator, and to
extend regulation to the previously uncovered field of commodity brokerage in order to suppress
cheating, fraud, and fictitious transactions in futures, which were seriously impairing the services
of the market." S. Rep. No. 850, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in [1978] U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 2087, 2096. To accomplish this goal, the Commodity Exchange Commission was
empowered to suspend or revoke the designation of an exchange as a contract market, issue cease
and desist brders, and establish speculative limits, which are limits on the amount of daily trading
and number of positions that can be held by speculators in futures transactions. H.R. Rep. No.
975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1974). Additionally, the Secretary of Agriculture was given
day-to-day regulatory authority over the trading of futures contracts, which were subject to the
terms of the CEA. Id. The Secretary of Agriculture, however, delegated much of this authority to
the Commodity Exchange Authority, an agency established within the Department of Agriculture
to administer the CEA. Id. The Secretary retained authority to designate contract markets,
promulgate regulations, and issue complaints. Id.
7. 17 C.F.R. §§ 1-180 (1979).
8. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389.
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Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act (CFTC Act), was the
so-called "Russian grain robbery" of 19729 in which the Soviet pur-
chase of millions of tons of United States grain ultimately resulted in
explosive price rises for grain and related consumer products in the
United States. 10 It was feared that "[w]ithout new controls there
[would be] nothing to prevent foreign nations from manipulating
commodity futures.""1 A Senate investigation concluded that in the
past the Commodity Exchange Authority (the Authority), a commis-
sion which formerly administered the CEA and which was replaced by
the CFTC, 12 had relied too heavily on the individual exchanges to
regulate trading,13 and was far too small to provide adequate monitor-
ing and supervision of the activities in all the commodities markets."4
9. See Soviet Grain Deal is Called a Coup, N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1972, at 1, col. 3; Prices of
Wheat at 9-Year Record, N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1972, at 39, col. 1; Farm Prices Rose to October
Record on Gains by Wheat, N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1972, at 57, col. 4; Agency Criticizes Soviet Grain
Deal, N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1972, at 43, col. 1.
10. "The 'grain robbery' of 1972 was one of those economic events that, like the OPEC oil
embargo ... can truly be said to have changed the world." D. Morgan, Merchants of Grain 121
(1979). See generally Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Multinational Corporations of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
11. 120 Cong. Rec. 10,741 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Adams). See generally id. at 10,736-37
(remarks of Rep. Poage); H.R. Rep. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 47-48 (1974). It was stated in the
debates that "[b]y dealing with four or five companies simultaneously the way the Russians did...
foreign [entities] can sometimes buy more of one commodity at a fixed price than (can) possibly be
delivered. They can indirectly speculate in huge volumes on our market. The grain companies who
sell to [these foreign entities] would not know at the time they sign the contract for a fixed price the
extent to which other dealers are also obligating themselves for the same kind of grain. This
happened in the Russian grain deal. They bought 50 percent more wheat than they needed. [AD-
though [the dealers] assumed the Russians were negotiating with others, [the dealers) had no idea
[the Russians] were buying the quantity of grain which they bought. [The Russians] then trans-
ferred the huge risk involved onto the backs of the unsuspecting American producers and pro-
cessors. By overbuying their needs, [the Russians] could later sell part of it at a much higher price
and profit from a manipulation which would be prohibited for domestic traders. I think it is
inevitable that such a huge manipulation or distortion in some commodities will occur if steps are
not taken to prevent it." 120 Cong. Rec. 10,751 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Smith). The Senate
subsequently found no evidence to support the allegation that the Russians deliberately engaged in
market manipulation. See S. Rep. No. 1033, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 60-61 (1974).
12. The Commodity Exchange Commission, the Secretary of Agriculture, and the Authority
were the former administrators of the CEA until the creation of the CFTC. See note 6 supra.
13. S. Rep. No. 1033, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1974). The Authority's reliance on the self-
regulatory structure of the exchange was described as " 'fox in the chicken coop' regulation." Id.
See generally Self-Regulation, supra note 2.
14. In the post-Authority era, the dollar value of the commodities for which commodity futures
contracts are traded has increased from $676 billion in 1976 to more than $1.5 trillion in 1978.
Compare CFTC, 1976 Annual Report 12 (1977) with Wall St. J., Jan. 9. 1979, at 38, col. 5. It
should be noted, however, that these figures are "somewhat theoretical" because they represent the
value if deliveries had been made on all contracts traded. In actuality, delivery is made only on a
small percentage of the contracts traded. 1 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 318 (1977); see Powers &
Tosini, Commodity Futures Exchanges and the North-South Dialogue, 1977 Am. J. Agr. Econ.
977.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
It was thought, therefore, that a new commission with strengthened
powers, independent of the Agriculture Department and special inter-
ests, was needed to assure adequate regulation in the event of future
attacks on United States markets by foreign governments. 5 Congress
also wanted to bring the previously unregulated futures trading in
world commodities 16 under a "single regulatory umbrella."'' 7
To increase regulatory control, the term "commodity" 1 8 was made
applicable to transactions in futures and options, 19 not only on the
15. S. Rep. No. 1033, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1974). See generally Commodity Futures Trading
Commission Act: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. (pt. 3) 758 (1974); Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974: Hearings on I.R.
11955 Before the House Committee on Agriculture, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 77-78 (1974) (statement of
Kally Simiris).
16. Although there was significant opposition to the regulation of world commodities, in
enacting the CFTC Act Congress determined that "[w]hether a commodity is grown or mined, or
whether it is produced in the United States or outside, makes little difference to those in this
country who buy, sell, and process the commodity or to U.S. consumers whose prices are affected
by the futures market in the commodity." H.R. Rep. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 82 (1974);
accord, S. Rep. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 19, 47, reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 5843, 5859, 5885; 120 Cong. Rec. 30,463-64 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Clark); id. at 10,740
(remarks of Rep. Brown); id. at 10,745-49 (remarks of Rep. Thone); id. at 10,749-51 (remarks of
Rep. Smith). Congress recognized, however, that regulation of world commodities presented some
"special problems" and the CFTC was given flexibility to distinguish between different commod-
ities. Id. at 30,458-62 (remarks of Sen. Talmadge). See generally Greenstone, The Foreign Com-
modity Trader: A Regulatory Dilemma, 30 Ad. L. Rev. 535 (1978).
17. H.R. Rep. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1974).
18. Originally, the CEA applied only to commodity futures trading in wheat, corn, oats,
barley, rye, flaxseed, grain sorghums, cotton, mill feeds, butter, eggs, potatoes, and rice. Commod-
ity Exchange Act, ch. 545, § 2, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936). Although Congress often amended the CEA to
encompass additional commodities, H.R. Rep. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1974), this
expansion was insufficient because the number of commodities on which futures were traded
increased at a more rapid pace. For example, trading commenced in futures contracts on various
international currencies including Canadian dollars, pounds sterling, Mexican pesos, and in other
commodities including silver, copper, platinum, industrial fuel oil, heating oil, palladium and gold.
See S. Rep. No. 850, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in [1978] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
2087, 2097; H.R. Rep. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1974). To eliminate the need for an
amendment every time trading began in a commodity not specifically enumerated in the CEA, the
CFTC Act expanded the definition of a commodity to include, in addition to previously regulated
commodities, "all other goods and articles . . . and all services, rights, and interests in which
contracts for future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in." 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). This
grant of jurisdiction encompassed all futures trading including the world commodities such as
coffee, sugar, and cocoa. See note 16 supra.
19. A commodity option is "a unilateral contract which gives the buyer the right to buy or sell a
specified quantity of a commodity at a specific price within a specified period of time, regardless of
the market price of that commodity." CFTC, Glossary of Some Terms Commonly Used in the
Futures Trading Industry 19-20 (1978). See generally Schief & Markham, supra note 3, at 21;
Schobel & Markham, Commodity Options-A New Industy Or Another Debacle?, Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) (Special Supp.) (No. 347, Apr. 7, 1976). In addition to commodity options and
commodity futures trading, the CFTC regulates leverage transactions. See generally Bor, Some
Issues Arising in Consideration of the Futures Trading Ac , of1978, 34 Rec. A.B. City N.Y. 278,
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United States contract markets, but also on "any other board of trade,
exchange, or market. °20 In the Senate debates it was noted that these
words were added to expand the CFTC's jurisdiction to include
futures contracts purchased and sold in the United States but "exe-
cuted on a foreign board of trade, exchange, or narket. "21 This
jurisdiction, coupled with existing provisions of the CEA which define
interstate commerce to encompass commerce with foreign nations, 22
indicates that the congressional intent is to include international trans-
actions within the regulatory sweep of the CEA. 23
Shortly after its creation, the CFTC established several advisory
committees to recommend appropriate policies in a number of areas. 24
One of these advisory committees concluded that futures markets
possess much of their current utility because they are, in effect, world
markets, and that the price discovery.processes of futures trading can
only be carried out in a worldwide context.25 This committee also
expressed the view that, while foreign trading entities should have the
broadest possible access to United States markets, nevertheless "for-
eign traders must be bound by the same rules as domestic traders-in
terms of reporting positions, the requirement for orderly markets, and
in all other aspects."12 6
280-85 (1979); Greenstone, Leverage Transactions: On Creating A Regulatory Theme, 27 Emory
L.J. 909 (1978).
20. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
21. 120 Cong. Rec. 34,997 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Talmadge) (emphasis added); accord, id. at
34,737 (remarks of Rep. Poage).
22. Section 2(a)(1) of the CEA defines interstate commerce as: "Commerce between any State,
Territory, or possession, or the District of Columbia, and any place outside thereof... ." 7 U.S.C. §
2 (1976) (emphasis added). Section 2(b) of the CEA further declares that "[flor the purpose of this
section the word 'State' includes Territory, the District of Columbia, possession of the United
Statps, and foreign nation." Id. § 3 (emphasis added). Finally, in setting forth legislative findings of
the effects of futures trading, § 3 of the CEA notes that such transactions are affected with a
"national public interest," and that prices in such transactions "are generally quoted and dissemi-
nated throughout the United States and in foreign countries as a basis for determining the prices to
the producer and the consumer... and to facilitate the movements thereof in interstate commerce."
Id. § 5 (emphasis added).
23. Because this legislation is remedial, 120 Cong. Rec. 34,997 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Tal-
madge); id. at 34,737 (remarks of Rep. Poage), it is to be broadly construed to effectuate its
remedial purposes. Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96, 103 (7th Cir. 1977); see
CFTC v. British Am. Commodity Options Corp., 560 F.2d 135, 143 (2d Cir. 1977). cert. denied,
438 U.S. 905 (1978); CFTC v. United States Metals Depository Co., 2 Comm. Fut L. Rep. (CCH)
20,807, at 23,284 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
24. 40 Fed. Reg. 32,866 (1975).
25. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Advisory Committee, Report on the Economic
Role of Contract Markets 24 (1976).
26. Id. In a dissent to the majority report, one of the committee members noted, however,
that actions by foreign governments have "tremendous" impact on United States markets, and
that some of those countries are totalitarian societies which allow little or no access to United
States citizens. Id. at 24 n. 1. The dissenter believed that the large market power of such countries
19791
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The CFTC's current view on foreign trader policy, therefore, is that
there should be parity of treatment between foreign and domestic
traders. 27 The theoretical notion of parity, however, creates problems
in application. For example, CFTC Commissioner David Gartner has
questioned whether parity of treatment requires foreign traders to
maintain records in the United States, or whether it means that they
should be permitted to maintain the required records in their domiciles
or places of incorporation. 28 Nevertheless, this parity of treatment
concept, while not universally applied, has been adopted by the CFTC
as a basis for determining appropriate regulatory requirements for
international transactions. In the face of "increased interest in the use
of futures markets in recent years by foreign participants, [and]
increased price volatility and public sensitivity to possible foreign
disruption of U.S. futures markets, '29 examination of the scope of
CFTC regulation of foreign involvement in commodity trading affect-
ing the United States is timely.
I. THE CEA AND CFTC AS LEVERS AGAINST FOREIGN
ABUSE OF UNITED STATES MARKETS
A. Reporting Requirements
One of the most important devices for regulating foreign participa-
tion in United States markets is the CEA's reporting requirements." 0
could disrupt the United States markets, and that foreign traders should have access to the
United States futures markets only to the extent that United States traders have access to
commodity cash markets and futures markets in the foreign country. He also expressed the view
that foreign traders "should be subject to additional CFTC reporting, monitoring, and surveil-
lance beyond that required for domestic traders." Id.
27. This policy was recently expressed in a CFTC release proposing additional requirements
for foreign traders. 44 Fed. Reg. 28,678 (1979).
28. Remarks of Commissioner David G. Gartner before the ABA Comm. on Commodities
Regulation, reprinted in 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,695, at 22,822 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as Gartner Address].
29. 42 Fed. Reg. 62,147, 62,150 (1977).
30. 7 U.S.C. § 6i (1976); 17 C.F.R. §§ 15-20 (1979). The reporting requirements are applicable
both to domestic personnel and to foreign brokers, id. § 15, and are the CFTC's "basic tool for
market surveillance in the detection and prevention of market congestion and price manipulation
and distortion." I Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 8,001 (1979). For example, under the CFTC's
reporting device known as the Large Trader Reporting System, a person is required to file an initial
report, 17 C.F.R. § 18.00 -.07 (1979), when his futures transactions on contract markets equal or
exceed specified levels for each commodity established by the CFTC. Id. § 15.03. Once these
reportable levels are reached, domestic and foreign professionals are also required to file a report
disclosing both background information on, and market transactions of, their customer. Id. §
17.00 -.01. The transaction section of this report duplicates and acts as a check on the report filed
by the customer pursuant to the Large Trader Reporting System. In addition to filing these reports,
the professionals involved are also required to keep books and records of their reportable transac-
tions and related cash commodity transactions, inventories, and purchase and sale commitments.
7 U.S.C. § 6i (1976).
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Prior to the CFTC Act, the Authority expressed the view that the
reporting requirements "relate to acts which take place in this country
and which have an effect upon markets intended to be regulated." 31
Persons trading on contract markets are generally "subject to the
reporting requirements regardless of residence, and for their failure to
comply the [gjovernment has the right to deny [such persons] trading
privileges on all contract markets. '32 The Authority also determined
that a foreign broker was required to disclose the identity of foreign
customers holding reportable futures positions, 33 and that both foreign
and domestic inventories or purchase and sale commitments 34 were to
be included in the cash grain reports required by the Authority's
regulations. 35
After its creation, however, the CFTC noted that it had not had
uniform success in obtaining information from foreign traders because
of communication difficulties and the failure of some foreign brokers36
to identify their customers and to provide other information required
by CFTC regulations. 37 The CFTC was concerned with the possible
consequences of inadequate reporting from foreign traders. It was
thought, for example, that foreign government traders, "because of
their relative size, might be more inclined [than private traders] to act
to acquire market positions that would result in a threatened or actual
market manipulation or corner, and that a foreign government might
attempt to use the United States futures markets as a means of
acquiring scarce supplies. ' 38 The CFTC also recognized, however,
particularly in the case of the world commodities, that unduly restrict-
ing foreign participation in United States futures markets could have
an adverse effect upon the United States economy. 39
To deal with this problem of potential foreign government abuse,
the reporting requirements for futures commission merchants,40 for-
31. Administrative Determination No. 51, at 2. (Mar. 17, 1938) (on file with the Fordham
Law Review).
32. Id.
33. Administrative Determination No. 207 (June 29, 1967) (on file with the Fordham Law
Review).
34. Administrative Determination No. 196 (Aug. 25, 1964) (on file with the Fordham Law
Review).
35. 17 C.F.R. § 19.00 (1979).
36. A foreign broker is "any person located outside of the United States or its territories who
carries an account in commodity futures on any contract market for any other person." 17 C.F.R §
15.00(a) (1979).
37. 42 Fed. Reg. 62,147-48 (1977).
38. Id. at 62,150.
39. Id.
40. Futures commission merchants are defined as: "individuals, associations, partnerships,
corporations, and trusts engaged in soliciting or in accepting orders for the purchase or sale of any
commodity for future delivery on or subject to the rules of any contract market and that, in or in
connection with such solicitation or acceptance of orders, accepts any money, securities, or
1979]
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eign brokers,4 1 and large traders42 were expanded to require informa-
tion identifying foreign government agencies and instrumentalities
trading on United States futures markets. 43 The CFTC's ability to
regulate transactions of foreign government entities within the United
States should also be viewed in light of the Foreign Sovereign Immu-
nity Act of 1976, which provides that a foreign state, its agencies or
instrumentalities are not immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of
the United States when the cause of action is based upon the foreign
state's commercial activity in the United States. 44
The CFTC's concern over market manipulation by foreign interests
is applicable not only to foreign government entities but also to foreign
brokers trading on United States markets. In fact, the failure of a
foreign broker to comply with CFTC reporting requirements may
result in an enforcement action. 45 In a recent case, In re Wiscope,
S.A., 46 the CFTC charged Wiscope, a Swiss-based foreign broker,
with failing to respond to a CFTC special call 47 requesting the identity
of the broker's customers. Wiscope argued that as a Swiss entity it was
subject to Swiss customer confidentiality laws, that under those laws it
could not release the identity of its customers without their consent,
property (or extends credit in lieu thereof) to margin, guarantee, or secure any trades or contracts
that result or may result therefrom." 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
41. See note 36 supra.
42. See note 30 supra.
43. 17 C.F.R. § 18.04 (1979); 43 Fed. Reg. 60,146 (1978). The CFTC eliminated a proposal
that would have required futures commission merchants to provide detailed information identifying
foreign government agencies or their instrumentalities. Instead, the CFTC required the disclosure
of that information by the trader itself. The CFTC noted that shifting the disclosure requirement
was necessary because governments might not have been willing to provide such identification to a
futures commission merchant but would provide it to a government agency such as the CFTC. Id.
at 60,147.
44. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1976); see 42 Fed. Reg. 62,147, 62,159 n.6 (1977).
45. The CFTC has broad enforcement powers. For example, the CFTC is authorized to
institute administrative proceedings to revoke or suspend the registration of persons registered
under the CEA, 7 U.S.C. § 9 (1976), to prohibit persons from trading on or subject to the rules of
any contract market, id., to issue cease and desist orders against violators, id, § 13b, and to impose
civil penalties of up to $100,000 for each violation, id. § 9. In addition, the CFTC is authorized to
seek injunctive relief to restrain violations of the Act. Id. § 13a-1. See generally Markham,
Injunctive Actions Under the Commodity Exchange Act, Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) B-I (May 23,
1979).
46. No. 79-14 (CFTC Mar. 19, 1979), reprinted in 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,785.
47. 17 C.F.R. § 21.00-.02 (1979). The information wich may be sought by such calls Includes
the names and addresses of the persons who exercise trading control over a customer account, and
"[t]he name, address and principal occupation of all traders, including house accounts, holding
open contracts on the records of such futures commission merchant ... or foreign broker; . . . [tihe
open contracts held or controlled by such traders in each future; and ... [tjhe classification of such
traders' open contracts as speculative, spreading (straddling), or hedging, or as 'futures commission
merchant' or 'foreign broker,' if such trader is another futures commission merchant or foreign
broker." Id.
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and that it was unable to obtain this consent from its customers. 48 The
CFTC held that Wiscope could not interpose Swiss law as a basis for
refusing to answer a special call and stated:
[Bly attempting to have both the use of American commodity futures markets and the
protection of Swiss law vis-a-vis its transactions here, Wiscope implicitly seeks an
extra-territorial sweep for the Swiss law. But any conflict between the laws of
Switzerland and the [CEA] arises solely from Wiscope's deliberate choice to effect
transactions on a United States contract market and therefore to subject itself to the
full rigor of regulation by this Commission. Respondent could have avoided any
conflict with Swiss law by either obtaining consent from its customers before it
accepted their orders, an act not in conflict with Swiss law, or by not implementing
those orders. Regardless of whether it was by design or neglect, it was Wiscope's own
conduct which has created its apparent dilemma, and we will not permit it to demand
special treatment on that basis. The Swiss laws to which it points are not an absolute
defense to the violation charged.4 9
The CFTC also rejected the claim that it lacked personal jurisdiction
over Wiscope and held that Wiscope's activities in trading on United
States contract markets constituted a sufficient nexus for CFTC juris-
diction.5"
The CFTC prohibited Wiscope from further trading on contract
markets in the United States until such time as Wiscope demonstrated
that it would be able to comply with the provisions of the CEA and
regulations promulgated thereunder.51 On appeal, the Second Circuit
reversed the CFTC's decision but sidestepped the issue of the extent of
the CFTC's authority by holding that the CFTC had impermissibly
relied on information outside the record before the Administrative Law
Judge in considering Wiscope's claim that the special call had not been
properly made.5 2
In another administrative proceeding, In re Compania Salvadorena
de Cafe, S.A., 5 3 the CFTC charged a Brazilian company and its
subsidiary with violating a CFTC regulation requiring traders who
48. 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,785, at 23,194-95.
49. Id. at 23,200 (footnotes omitted). A similar view had previously been expressed by the
CFTC General Counsel, [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¢ 20,120 (Dec.
12, 1975), and by an official of the Authority, Administrative Determination No. 207 (June 29,
1967) (on file with the Fordhan Law Review). See also Montship Lines Ltd. v. Federal Maritime
Bd., 295 F.2d 147, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (prior to determining whether a foreign law bars disclosure
of documents ordered to be produced by the Board, the proper procedure is to require the
individual to "make a good faith attempt to obtain a waiver" of the restriction from his govern-
ment).
50. 2 Comm. FuL L. Rep. (CCH) 20,785, at 23,198-99.
51. The CFTC refused a request by Wiscope to modify the sanction. Id. 1 20,813 (Apr. 24,
1979). The CFTC's position on requiring foreign traders to comply with its reporting requirements
"has caused a great deal of friction [with] members of the international commodities business."
Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., The Extraterritorial Implications of the Commodity Exchange
Act 5 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Extraterritorial Implications].
52. Wiscope, S.A. v. CFTC, No. 79-4077 (2d Cir. Aug. 6, 1979).
53. No. 79-34 (CFTC, filed Mar. 12, 1979).
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hold reportable positions54 in a commodity to "keep books and records
showing all details concerning all positions and transactions for future
delivery in the commodity on all contract markets," and to furnish this
information to the CFTC upon request. 55 The complaint charged that
the company and its subsidiary had refused to respond to a CFTC
request for disclosure of the terms and conditions of transactions with
foreign entities involving coffee traded on the New York Coffee and
Sugar Exchange.
5 6
This action is still pending, but its ultimate resolution should
provide an indication of the measure of the CFTC's authority to
require large foreign traders to submit to CFTC investigations. If the
CFTC requirement of disclosure of records maintained abroad as a
condition of trading on United States contract markets is upheld by the
courts, the CFTC will have broad authority to regulate foreign in-
volvement in United States markets.
Following its ruling in Wiscope and the issuance of the complaint in
In re Compania Salvadorena de Cafe, S.A., the CFTC proposed
additional rules designed to enhance the effectiveness of its jurisdiction
over foreign traders.57 These proposals would require foreign brokers
or traders to designate a person in the United States as an agent to
accept service and communications from the CFTC. Such designation
would be required to be filed with the CFTC and with the domestic
futures commission merchant used by the foreign broker or trader. A
futures commission merchant who did not receive a copy of this
designation would be prohibited from executing transactions for the
54. 17 C.F.R. § 15.03 (1979); see note 30 supra.
55. 17 C.F.R. § 18.05 (1979). See also Montship Lines Ltd. v. Federal Maritime Board, 295
F.2d 147, 154 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (the investigatory powers of the Board, including the power to
compel reports and disclosure of information by foreign carriers, is not limited to the territorial
confines of the United States).
56. Complaint at 13, In re Compania Salvadorena de Cafe, S.A., No. 79-34 (CFTC, filed Mar.
12, 1979). The complaint also charged domestic futures commission merchants and certain of their
officers with manipulating, attempting to manipulate, or aiding and abetting the manipulation of
the July 1977 "C" Contract on the New York Coffee and Sugar Exchange, a contract market. Id.
at 10-11. The merchants and their officers were charged with aiding and abetting the alleged
manipulation by, among other things, entering sell orders at prices substantially above the market,
by stopping delivery notices, and by taking delivery of the contracts for the foreign accounts "when
they knew or should have known that [the foreign entities] were acting for the purpose and with the
intent of causing prices of the July 1977 'C' Contract to be artificially high and, in fact, caused the
prices to be artificially high." Id. at 10.
This case will no doubt be an important test of the CFTC's ability to regulate foreign traders and
to assess liability on domestic futures commission merchants handling such accounts. See generally
Rising Coffee Prices and the Federal Response: Joint Hearings Before Certain Subcomms. of the
House Comm. on Government Operations, and the House Comm. on Agriculture, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 72 (1977).
57. 44 Fed. Reg. 28,678 (1979). These proposals stemmed from earlier CFTC proposals for
foreign traders. See 42 Fed. Reg. 62,147 (1977).
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foreign broker or trader. The foreign broker would also be required to
obtain the consent of its customers to permit the foreign broker's agent
to act as the customer's agent in receiving communications and service
from the CFTC.5
8
These proposals are designed to preclude circumvention of CFTC
regulations by persons trading through a chain of foreign brokers; for
example, a "trader... placing an order through a foreign broker, who
then places the same order in its name, rather than the trader's name,
with another foreign broker." 9 In order to preclude such conduct, the
CFTC's proposed rules explicitly recognize that a foreign broker's
customer may also be a foreign broker with its own customers, and
that disclosure of the identity of those customers may also be re-
quired. 60 These proposals should also eliminate the conffict of laws
problem faced by the foreign broker in the Wiscope case because, in
the words of the CFTC, "since a foreign broker will be required to
obtain the consent of its customers to disclose their identity, market
positions and any other required information, any potential problems
with local financial privacy laws should be resolved in advance of a
Commission request for information. '61
It has been suggested that the CFTC's foreign agent proposal could
cause problems in the United States relations with other countries. 62 A
similar proposal had previously been made in Congress for the Federal
Maritime Commission, but was stricken from the legislation when
several foreign governments protested and the State Department ob-
jected that such a requirement would be detrimental to United States
foreign relations. 63 Because Congress objected to giving such extrater-
ritorial authority to the Federal Maritime Commission, an agency
which generally deals with foreign commerce, 64 it is possible those
same considerations may preclude the enactment or, if enacted, the
enforcement of the CFTC's foreign agent proposal.65
58. 44 Fed. Reg. 28,678 (1979).
59. Id. at 28,680.
60. Id.
61. Id. In making these proposals the CFTC stated that it was "informed that certain nations
impose restrictions on the ability of a foreign government or agency thereof to send communications
directly to citizens or firms of that nation. For example, the Commission has been advised that it
may be inappropriate under Swiss law for the Commission to send any form of communication
directly to firms or traders domiciled in Switzerland; rather, the Commission may be requested to
address all such communications through diplomatic channels. Certain types of communications
that may be necessary to meet the requirements of the Commodity Exchange Act and due process
may be perceived as offensive by Swiss officials because of their 'threatening' tone and, for this
reason, would not be delivered to the traders." Id. at 28,679.
62. See Gartner Address, supra note 28.
63. Id. at 22,823.
64. 46 U.S.C. §§ 1111-1126(d) (1976).




Another major weapon against foreign abuse of United States mar-
kets is the CFTC's ability to take immediate action in an emergency. 6
6
Emergency is defined as including actions of "a foreign government
affecting a commodity or any other major market disturbance which
prevents the market from accurately reflecting the forces of supply and
demand for such commodity. '6 7 This power was intended to be used
by the CFTC "in the case of another Russian grain deal [to stop] the
Russians [from] going into the market and using the exchanges as a
means of making a double profit on a deal with the United States." 68
The CFTC's emergency power was recently challenged in Board of
Trade v. CFTC. 69 In that action a district court preliminarily enjoined
the CFTC from exercising its authority to compel the Chicago Board
of Trade to terminate trading in March 1979 wheat futures. The
district court believed that "[a]n emergency is something that is dra-
matic and obvious, ordinarily obvious, critical, and about which
reasonable people ordinarily would not disagree," and found no evi-
dence that such an emergency existed. 70 The court apparently over-
looked the statutory definition of emergency power which includes
threatened as well as actual market disturbances. 7 1
In denying a stay of the district court's order, the Seventh Circuit 72
stated that, while the CFTC's expertise in such matters is entitled to
great deference,
[tihe failure of the Commission to present countervailing evidence, the purport of
which would in essence be to demonstrate that its action was not arbitrary, overcomes
in this case the customary deference accorded to the administrative determination of
emergency. We do not say that the Commission would have been required to produce
substantial countervailing evidence; we do say that the complete absence of any
66. 7 U.S.C. § 12a(9) (1976). Contract markets themselves are authorized to take emergency
action without first obtaining CFTC approval. Id. § 7a(12). The CFTC has recently issued
guidelines to be used by contract markets in such emergency situations. CFTC Interpretative
Letter No. 79-2, reprinted in 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,860 (July 25, 1979).
67. 7 U.S.C. § 12a(9) (1976).
68. 120 Cong. Rec. 10,767 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Poage); see note 9 supra.
69. 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,780 (N.D. Ill. 1979). The emergency was based on a
large concentration of ownership of wheat futures by a small number of speculators. Id,
20,783-84. While it appears that only domestic speculators were involved in this case, the same
kind of emergency could arise by reason of foreign interests in the market.
70. 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) T 20,780, at 23,185-6.
71. 7 U.S.C. § 12a(9) (1976).
72. Board of Trade v. CFTC, No. 79-1278 (7th Cir. Mar. 19, 1979) reprinted in 2 Comm. Fut.
L. Rep. (CCH) T 20,781.
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support for its emergency determination leaves the plaintiffs claim of arbitrary action
undisputed.
7 3
Subsequently, however, in the CFTC's appeal on the merits, the
district court was reversed. 74 The Seventh Circuit, in holding that
Congress had committed the determination of the existence of an
emergency to the discretion of the CFTC, stated:
The legislative history amply demonstrates a congressional purpose to establish a
Commission with broad regulatory and enforcement powers, and with the capability
and expertise of taking swift and effective action when the Commission has reason to
believe an emergency exists. Congress recognized that regulation of the volatile futures
markets could be accomplished effectively only through the use of an expert Commis-
sion, that situations could occur suddenly for which the traditional enforcement
powers would be an inadequate response, and that therefore the Commission should
have emergency powers, the exercise of which is committed to the expertise and
discretion of the Commission. Judicial review of the Commission's emergency determi-
nation would thwart the very purpose for which Congress authorized the emergency
powers.
7 5
This decision appears to be correct if its import is to preclude a full-
scale hearing before the CFTC can act in an emergency. Indeed, under
the restrictions applied in the earlier Seventh Circuit opinion the
important remedial purposes of the CFTC's emergency power would
have been rendered ineffectual. The emergency power is a preventive
measure to be used in emergency situations, often on short notice and
in highly volatile markets, and a delay caused by court hearings could
neutralize the CFTC's ability to act in exigent circumstances. 76 For
example, a government on a hit and run raid on a United States
market could be in and out of the market before the CFTC could take
effective action.
While the Seventh Circuit's current decision should preclude any
undue interference in the flexibility of the CFTC's action, protection is
needed against arbitrary and capricious governmental action. In this
regard, it was assumed by Congress that the emergency power would
be used only with extreme caution. 7 7 It should be applied flexibly to
allow the CFTC to act, for example, when the CFTC "is of the
73. Id. at 23,186.
74. Board of Trade v. CFTC, No. 79-1278 (7th Cir. Sept. 12, 1979).
75. Id., slip op. at 16. The court concluded that the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §
701(a)(2) (1976), precludes judicial review where an action is committed to the discretion of an
agency. Board of Trade v. CFTC, No. 79-1278, slip op. at 17 (7th Cir. Sept. 12, 1979); see
Equitable Trust Co. v. CFTC, 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. 20,892 (W.D. Tex. 1979).
76. In the Senate debates it was noted that recordkeeping by the exchanges was inadequate,
and that it would take considerable time to identify the traders on any particular day. See 120
Cong. Rec. 34,998 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Clark). Such a delay would also be fatal to any
meaningful preventive measure.
77. See S. Rep. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in [19741 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News, 5843, 5849-50; H.R. Rep. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4, 30 (1974).
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opinion that any foreign nation is stepping into the futures market and
so manipulating it as to endanger the values of American commod-
ities." 78 The appropriate standard should be that the government must
act in good faith, which is the standard applied to contract markets in
undertaking emergency action. 79 The Seventh Circuit viewed the
CFTC's emergency authority as being limited to those actions specified
in the statute: "actual or threatened market manipulations and corners,
acts of government affecting a commodity, and any other major
market disturbance which prevents the market from accurately reflect-
ing the sources of supply and demand for such commodity." 80 The
CFTC conceded, and case law supports the proposition, that "agency
action committed to agency discretion is nevertheless judicially re-
viewable where such action is challenged on constitutional grounds, or
upon a claim that the agency has acted in bad faith or in a manner
plainly repugnant to its statutory authority."'
Because cases arising under the federal securities laws are often used
as analogies in CFTC actions, 82 the extent of the CFTC's emergency
power should also be viewed in light of the Supreme Court's recent
decision in SEC v. Sloan. 83 This case involved a challenge to the
SEC's authority to summarily suspend trading in any security for up to
ten days if, in the opinion of the SEC, such action is required for the
protection of investors and the public interest.8 4 The Court held that
the SEC was exceeding its emergency powers by imposing successive
ten day summary suspensions of trading based on a single set of
circumstances. 85 The Court noted that if after the initial ten days
additional relief was needed, an injunction or other relief should be
sought. 86 Although the provisions of the CFTC and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act) differ materially in that
broader powers are conferred upon the CFTC,8 7 the Sloan case
appears to evidence a judicial distaste for summary actions such as
those authorized by the CFTC's emergency power, and may signal
that the courts will scrutinize closely the statutory limitations on such
authority.
78. 120 Cong. Rec. 34,750 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Poage).
79. Compania de Salvadorena de Cafe, S.A. v. CFTC, No. 77 Civ. 5820 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14,
1978), reprinted in 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,571, at 22,324.
80. Board of Trade v. CFTC, No. 79-1278, slip op. at 11 (7th Cir. Sept. 12, 1979) (quoting 7
U.S.C. § 12a(9) (1976)).
81. Id., slip op. at 9 n.6.
82. See note 100 infra and accompanying text.
83. 436 U.S. 103 (1978).
84. 15 U.S.C. § 78e'(k) (1976).
85. 436 U.S. at 111.
86. Id. at 115.
87. See notes 66-67 supra and accompanying text.
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II. THE EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH OF THE CEA AND
CFTC REGULATIONS
A. Antifraud Provisions
One of the CFTC's first acts was to adopt an antifraud rule88 to
govern the "solicitation or acceptance in the United States of orders for
commodity futures contracts that are traded or executed upon boards
of trade, exchanges or markets located outside the United States."8 9
This rule is a needed extension of the antifraud provisions of the
CEA,90 which are directed to transactions on contract markets desig-
nated as such by the CFTC, and which, therefore, may not encompass
transactions executed on a foreign market. 9'
The validity of this antifraud rule was recently questioned in Palmer
Trading Co. v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 92 in which a district
court held that the CFTC had exceeded its authority in adopting the
rule. 93 The court reasoned that because the language of the CEA's
antifraud provisions for futures contracts was directed only to domestic
contract markets, 94 the CFTC did not have authority to extend its
antifraud regulations to foreign futures transactions. 9- Apparently,
however, the court did not consider the effect of CEA § 12a(5), which
empowers the CFTC to make any rules or regulations it deems
necessary to carry out the purposes of the CEA. 96 This general
rulemaking authority, coupled with the statutory expansion of the
88. 17 C.F.R. § 30.02 (1979). The language of the antifraud rule as adopted is patterned after
the language of § 4b of the CEA, 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1976), except that the rule eliminates the
requirement of willfulness in order to avoid restrictive interpretations given to that requirement by
various courts. 40 Fed. Reg. 26,505 n.2 (1975). As originally proposed, the CFTC antifraud rule
tracked the language of SEC rule lOb-5. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1979). The CFTC, however,
subsequently determined to use the language in § 4b of the CEA as a model in order to avoid the
blind application of principles governing securities cases to cases arising under the CEA. 40 Fed.
Reg. 26,505 (1975). The CFTC's general authority to issue rules and regulations is found in 7
U.S.C. § 12a(5) (1976).
89. 40 Fed. Reg. 26,505 (1975).
90. 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1976). Among other things, the CEA makes it unlawful, in connection with
the purchase or sale of contracts for future delivery, for any person to cheat or defraud, or attempt
to cheat or defraud another person, or willfully to make or cause to be made false reports or
statements, or willfully to employ deceptive practices. 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1976). While the statutory
language requiring the conduct to be "in connection with" futures transactions, id., could be
interpreted as limiting the scope of the antifraud provisions, at least one court has held that such
provisions are to be given broad application and can apply to conduct which occurs prior to
opening a trading account. Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96, 104 (7th Cir. 1977).
91. 40 Fed. Reg. 18,187-88 (1975).
92. 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,890 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
93. Id. at 23,655.
94. 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1976).
95. 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. 20,890, at 23,654-55 (N.D. III. 1979).
96. 7 U.S.C. § 12a(5) (1976).
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CFTC's jurisdiction to include transactions on foreign exchanges, 97
appears to grant the CFTC authority to promulgate antifraud rules for
international transactions.
The CFTC also adopted an antifraud rule for commodity options, 98
and instituted several suits under that rule against dealers selling
London commodity options99 to the public in the United States. 100 In
one such case,101 the Fifth Circuit rejected a claim that provisions in
the CEA governing commodity options 0 2 did not apply to London
commodity options because they involved '!foreign commerce."'10 3 The
court, relying upon the interstate commerce provisions of the CEA, 104
held that in reading the sections of the CEA together it is "apparent
that the jurisdiction of the Commission is sufficiently broad to encom-
pass transactions involving foreign commerce, such as the London
[commodity] options."'105
97. See notes 21-23 supra and accompanying text.
98. 17 C.F.R. § 32.9 (1979).
99. "A 'London commodity option' is a contractual right to buy ('to go long,' referred to as a
'call option') or to sell ('to short,' referred to as a 'put option') a specified futures contract traded on
the London Markets for a particular commodity, at a specified price (referred to as the 'strike' price)
within a specified period of time (on or before the 'declaration date')." CFTC v. J.S. Love & Assoc.
Options, 422 F. Supp. 652, 654 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). See generally British Am. Commodity
Options Corp. v. Bagley, 552 F.2d 482, 484-85 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 938 (1977); CFTC
v. United States Metals Depository Co., 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,807, at 23,286
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); Kelley v. Carr, 442 F. Supp. 346, 348-49 (W.D. Mich. 1977); CFTC v. Crown
Colony Commodity Options, Ltd., 434 F. Supp. 911, 913-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
100. CFTC v. United States Metals Depository Co., 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,807
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); CFTC v. British Am. Commodity Options Corp., 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
20,662 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Kelley v. Carr, 442 F. Supp. 346 (W.D. Mich. 1977); CFTC v. Crown
Colony Commodity Options, Ltd., 434 F. Supp. 911 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); CFTC v. J.S. Love &
Assoc. Options, 422 F. Supp. 652 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); see Schief & Markham, supra note 3, at 21-26.
101. CFTC v. Muller, 570 F.2d 1296 (5th Cir. 1978).
102. 7 U.S.C. § 6c(b) (1976).
103. CFTC v. Muller, 570 F.2d 1296, 1299 (5th Cir. 1978) (emphasis added).
104. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2-3 (1976); see note 22 supra.
105. CFTC v. Muller, 570 F.2d 1296, 1299 (5th Cir. 1978). The CFTC had adopted rules that
would have imposed special requirements on London commodity options sales in the United States.
See Extraterritorial Implications, supra note 51, at 7. Those rules were upheld by the Second
Circuit in British Am. Commodity Options Corp. v. Bagley, 552 F.2d 482 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 938 (1977). The CFTC, however, subsequently determined to suspend all option sales, 17
C.F.R. § 32.11 (1979), except dealer options which are options "offered to a producer, processor, or
commercial user of, or a merchant handling .. . the commodity which is the subject of the
commodity option transaction ... solely for purposes related to its business as such. Id. at § 32.4;
see 43 Fed. Reg. 16,153 (1978). In 1978, the CEA was amended to provide that the CFTC could not
allow commodity options to be traded in the United States without prior notification to Congress.
Futures Trading Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-405, [1978] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 867 (to be
codified in 7 U.S.C. § 6c(c)). An exception to this prohibition authorizes the CFTC to allow the
offer and sale of domestic dealer options which meet certain requirements. Id. at 867-69, (to be
codified in 7 U.S.C. § 6c(d)). Another exemption applies to persons "not domiciled" in the United
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Although the CFTC has not tested the extraterritorial limits of its
antifraud provisions for domestic futures contracts, guidance as to
their ultimate scope may be drawn from cases arising under the federal
securities laws; such cases are often used as precedent in considering
the scope of similarly-worded sections of the CEA. 10 6
Under traditional standards of international law, the interest of a
state in applying its law is legitimized by conduct which has occurred
within its territory,10 7 effects of the conduct upon the state,"", and the
role played by nationals of the state. 10 9 In accordance with these
standards, courts have frequently given extraterritorial application to
the federal securities laws. Generally speaking, extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion of the Exchange Act has been held to attach when a fraud has
been perpetrated in the United States in connection with the purchase
or sale of securities. For example, misrepresentations made in the
United States to induce an American corporation to purchase the stock
of a British corporation at inflated prices on a foreign exchange have
been held to be remediable under the Exchange Act.'1 ° Similarly,
defendants who use the United States as a base for their fraudulent
activity abroad have been held subject to the Exchange Act, even
though there were few violative effects on American investors,"' or
even though only foreign investors were defrauded.
i l1
Extraterritorial jurisdiction also attaches where significant activity
States who meet conditions substantially equivalent to those required for domestic dealer options.
Id. at 869 (to be codified in 7 U.S.C. § 6c(d)). This provision also authorizes the CFTC to suspend
the sale of foreign dealer options prior to a hearing where such sales "in the Commission's judgment
present a substantial risk to the public interest." Id. (to be codified in 7 U.S.C. § 6c(d)). The CFTC
has not as yet authorized foreign dealers to sell options in the United States, but has authorized
domestic "dealer" options and has proposed a pilot option program for United States contract
markets. 17 C.F.R. § 32.12 (1979); 44 Fed. Reg. 22,088 (1979).
106. See CFTC v. British Am. Commodity Options Corp., 560 F.2d 13S, 141 n.ll (2d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 905 (1978); CFTC v. United States Metals Depository Co., 2 Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CC) 20,807, at 23,292 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); CFTC v. British Am. Commodity
Options Corp., 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,662, at 22,703 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Auditore v.
Rosenthal & Co., 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) T 20,658, at 22,668 (N.D. Ga. 1978); Kelley v.
Carr, 442 F. Supp. 346, 354 (W.D. Mich. 1977); CFTC v. Crown Colony Commodity Options,
Ltd., 434 F. Supp. 911, 919 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); CFTC v. J.S. Love & Assoc. Options, 422 F. Supp.
652, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
107. Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 17 (1965).
108. Id. § 18.
109. Id. § 30.
110. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1335 (2d Cir. 1972).
111. ]IT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1018 (2d Cir. 1975).
112. United States v. Cook, 573 F.2d 281, 283 (5th Cir. 1978); SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109,




designed to further a fraudulent scheme occurs within the country. "I3
Although courts have indicated that such jurisdiction ordinarily would
not attach if the fraudulent acts in the United States are merely of a
preparatory nature, 114 such preliminary acts may trigger extraterrito-
rial application of the Exchange Act when the injury is to American
citizens residing abroad.11 5 This rationale may have been extended by
a recent Eighth Circuit decision. 116 The sole victim in this case was a
foreign corporation, and the securities involved "were not traded on
any American exchange, had no measurable effect on domestic mar-
kets, and had only a minimal effect, if any, in the United States."",
The Court nevertheless concluded that the conduct in question-
nondisclosure of a claim to stock-was sufficient to confer jurisdiction
because the fraudulent scheme was devised and completed in the
United States and then exported to Australia. 118
Courts also consider the use of the mails or other instrumentalities of
interstate commerce in determining whether defendant's conduct in the
United States is sufficient to justify the exercise of jurisdiction. 19 One
case before the Eighth Circuit concerned misrepresentations made by a
Canadian corporation in connection with a tender offer for the shares
of another Canadian corporation. The offeror mailed a form letter to
its United States shareholders and made other contacts by mail and
telephone. The court held the conduct sufficient for subject matter
jurisdiction to attach "even though the securities [were] foreign ones
that had not been purchased on an American exchange.' 20
While an examination of the applicable cases reveals some general
principles concerning the extraterritorial application of the federal
securities laws, resolution of a particular issue will probably turn on
the particular facts of each case, weighed in light of the standards
adopted by the various circuits and the views expressed by the SEC
and its staff. The proposed Federal Securities Code 12 1 may add more
113. Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 421 (8th
Cir. 1979).
114. IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1018 (2d Cir. 1975); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc.,
519 F.2d 974, 985 n.24 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
115. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 992 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018
(1975).
116. Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409 (8th Cir.
1979).
117. Id. at 415.
118. Id. at 420.
119. Id. at 421; SEC v. United Financial Group, Inc., 474 F.2d 354, 356 (9th Cir. 1973); Travis
v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515, 526 (8th Cir. 1973).
120. Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515, 524 (8th Cir. 1973).
121. ALI Fed. Sec. Code § 1905 (Proposed Official Draft 1978).
[Vol. 48
CEA INTERNATIONAL REGULATION
certainty to this area. It would establish specific statutory standards for
application of the federal securities laws to international transactions.
For example, the Code would apply to conduct which takes place
outside the United States and has a substantial effect within the United
States as a direct and reasonably foreseeable result of the conduct. The
Code would also apply to acts initiated within the United States which
cause a prohibited act outside the United States. 22
B. Commodity Options
As noted, the CFTC has concluded that its authority to regulate
commodity options extends to United States transactions in options
traded on foreign exchanges. 123 In so concluding, the CFTC deter-
mined that "[a] contrary interpretation would emasculate the decision
of Congress to ban trading in the United States in options in those
commodities specifically enumerated in . . . the Act."' 24 For example,
the CFTC has issued a public announcement expressing its view that
transactions in commodity options on foreign futures involving con-
tracts in wool are prohibited by the CEA.12 s
It remains an open question whether the CFTC would construe its
regulatory authority to extend to options traded on foreign exchanges
but offered to American citizens outside the territorial jurisdiction of
the United States. Prior to the existence of the CFTC, the Authority
several times expressed the view that such foreign options transactions
would not violate the CEA.126 Because of the CFTC's expanded
122. For a thorough analysis of § 1905 see Liftin, The Extraterritorial Reach of the Federal
Securities Code: An Analysis of Section 1905, 32 Vand. L. Rev. 495 (1979).
123. 41 Fed. Reg. 26,606 (1976). This determination is based on the CEA's broad definition of
interstate commerce to include commerce with a foreign nation. See notes 22, l0s supra and
accompanying text.
124. 41 Fed. Reg. 26,606 (1976).
125. Id.
126. For example, an official of the Authority stated that the solicitation of commodity option
orders "in Canada for Canadian customers even by American firms who may be members of a
contract market in the United States" would not violate the CEA. Administrative Determination
No. $ (Sept. 21, 1936) (on file with the Fordham Law Review). On another occasion an official
noted: "The only way that any person, American or foreigner, and regardless of his place of
residence, can offer to enter into, enter into, or confirm the execution of such a~nJ [optionsi deal
without violating the [CEA] is for that person to be physically outside of the territorial jurisdiction
of the United States when he does so." Administrative Determination No. 38 (Dec. 17, 1937) (on file
with the Fordharn Law Review).
Administrative Determinations were a series of interpretations of the CEA issued by the Author-
ity while it administered the Act. Because Administrative Determinations are the early interpreta-
tions of the agency charged with enforcing the statute, courts may accord them great weight. See
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statutory power, 127 however, it is uncertain whether the CFTC will
adhere to the Authority's determination.
C. Arbitration Requirements
The CEA requires contract markets to "provide a fair and equitable
procedure through arbitration or otherwise for the settlement of cus-
tomers' claims and grievances.' 28 Shortly after its creation, the CFTC
issued an interpretation of this provision 129 and promulgated rules to
govern contract market arbitration procedures. 130 One of these rules
restricts the practice in which customers of futures commission mer-
chants agree, upon opening their account, to submit to arbitration any
disputes arising from that account. 131 The CFTC prohibits such
predispute agreements unless the customer gives his informed consent
to such an arrangement. In addition, the customer can never be
required to waive his right to seek reparations before the CFTC. 132
E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46, 54-55 (1977); United States v. Consumer
Life Ins. Co., 430 U.S. 725, 751-52 (1977); United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc.,
422 U.S. 694, 719 (1975); Chemeheuvi Tribe of Indians v. FPC, 420 U.S. 395, 409-10 (1975); Saxbe
v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 65, 74 (1974); NLRB v. Boeing Co,, 412 U.S. 67, 75 (1973); Trafficante v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210(1972); Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617,
626-27 (1971); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 11 (1965); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1965);
Hofmayer v. Dean Witter & Co. Inc., 459 F. Supp. 733, 738 (N.D. Cal. 1978). See also Klxmlller
v. SEC, 492 F.2d 641, 644 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (less weight is to be given to interpretations of
officials who are not agency heads). The Supreme Court, however, has several times rejected the
statutory interpretations of administrative agencies such as the SEC. SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103,
117-19 (1978); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 41 n.27 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212-14 (1976); United Hous. Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837,
858 n.25 (1975); Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 425-27 (1972). The
possibility of such rejection exists because the Court's deference to agency action must be con-
strained by the Court's "obligation to honor the clear meaning of a statute, as revealed by its
language, purpose and history." International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 99 S. Ct. 790, 800 n.20
(1979). In the future, the views of the CFTC may be accorded greater weight than the views of tile
Authority because of the CFTC's expanded statutory role. The CFTC, however, considers the
Administrative Determinations of the Authority very important and has sought public comment
before overturning them. See 44 Fed. Reg. 33,839 (1979); 43 Fed. Reg. 32,092 (1978). See generally
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15984 (July 2, 1979), reprinted in (1979 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) V 82,122; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1976).
127. See notes 18-23 supra and accompanying text.
128. 7 U.S.C. § 7a(ll) (1976).
129. 40 Fed. Reg. 29,121 (1975).
130. 17 C.F.R. § 180.1-.6 (1979).
131. 17 C.F.R. § 180.3 (1979).
132. Id. § 180.3(b). See generally Rosen, Reparation Proceedings Under the Commodity
Exchange Act, 27 Emory L. J. 1005, 1011-14 (1978); Schneider, Commodities Law and Predispute
Arbitration Clauses, 6 Hofstra L. Rev. 129 (1977). Section 14 of the CEA provides a procedure for
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In determining the application of these rules to international transac-
tions, cases arising under the federal securities law again provide
helpful analogies. In Wilko v. Swan, 133 the Supreme Court held an
arbitration agreement invalid insofar as it required a domestic cus-
tomer of a securities brokerage firm to waive a private right of action
for violation of the federal securities law. The Court stated that,
despite the provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act, 134 section 14 of
the Securities Act of 1933135 prohibited such a waiver. 136 In Scherk v.
Alberto-Culver Co., 137 however, the Court refused to extend Wilko to
international transactions. The Court distinguished Scherk on the
ground that the transactions in question involved an international
agreement made by an American corporation investing in a foreign
business, and held that the requirements of international commerce
necessitate broad recognition of international arbitration agree-
ments. 
138
Policy considerations such as those set forth in Scherk may also
apply to international commodity futures transactions. If so, CFTC
regulations may be ineffective to deal with predispute arbitration
agreements in such transactions. 139 The reparation provision of the
CEA, 140 however, clearly intends protection for nonresidents.' 41 The
reach of the CEA, therefore, may be found to be sufficiently broad to
offer protection in international transactions.
an administrative hearing before the CFTC to adjudicate and award damages for violations of the
Act by registered persons. 7 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
133. 346 U-S. 427 (1953).
134. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-208 (1976).
135., 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1976).
136. 346 U.S. at 434-35.
137. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
138. Id. at 517-20; see 9 U.S.C. § 201 (1976). The Court also suggested that the provisions of
the Exchange Act may be distinguishable from the provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 that were
in issue in Wilko. 417 U.S. at 513-15.
139. One could conceivably argue that the policy considerations in Scherk could also apply to a
Wiscope conflict of laws situation. See notes 46-52 supra and accompanying text. It seems likely,
however, that Scherk will not be read that broadly because of the significant sovereign interest in
protecting United States markets.
140. 7 U.S.C. § 18 (1976). This provision was added in 1974 to provide a forum for customers
damaged because of violations of the CEA or CFTC regulations. Only registered person-
associated persons, floor brokers, futures commission merchants, commodity trading advisers and
commodity pool operators--are subject to damages in reparations proceedings, although such
registered persons can make counterclaims related to the transactions involved in the proceeding.
Id. §§ 18(a), (d); 17 C.F.R. § 12.23(b)(2) (1979). See generally Hudson. Customer Protection in The
Commodity Futures Market, 58 B.U.L. Rev. 1 (1978); Rosen, supra note 32.
141. 7 U.S.C. § 18(d) (1976).
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I. REGULATION OF FOREIGN PROFESSIONALS
A. Futures Commission Merchants
1. Registration Requirements
The Authority apparently considered a domestic broker acting for
foreign customers but trading on United States markets to be subject
to the CEA's registration requirements. 142 In one case, a futures
commission merchant let his registration lapse and did not reapply for
five years. During this five-year period the merchant traded on United
States contract markets but only for foreign customers. The Authority
held that the merchant violated the CEA by failing to register as a
futures commission merchant. 143 Registration was not required, how-
ever, if all a broker did was solicit orders in the United States for
execution on a foreign market.1 44 Moreover, if a foreign broker
solicited funds only in a foreign country, registration as a futures
commission merchant was not required even if the foreign firm was a
member of a contract market in the United States on which transac-
tions were being executed. 145 Conversely, the Authority held that "a
foreign branch of an American firm or a wholly owned foreign
subsidiary of an American corporation or firm would be subject to the
same requirements as a parent organization operating in this coun-
try."'146 The Authority also ruled that a futures commission merchant's
142. Administrative Determination No. 42 (Jan. 17, 1938) (on file with the Fordham Law
Review). The CEA requires futures commission merchants to register with the CFTC. 7 U.S.C. §
6d (1976). Registration as a futures commission merchant is also required for persons conducting
transactions in commodity options. 17 C.F.R. § 32.3 (1979). Such transactions are, however, with
limited exceptions, presently prohibited in the United States. See note 105 supra.
143. In re Garnac Grain Co., 8 Agric. Dec. 244 (1949).
144. Administrative Determination No. 6 (Sept. 28, 1936) (on file with the Fordhsam Law
Review). Under the federal securities laws, however, registration is required when a foreign broker
uses the mails or other instrumentalities of interstate commerce to effect any transaction in, or to
induce the purchase or sale of, any security. Letter from David J. Romanski, Attorney, Office of the
Chief Counsel, Securities and Exchange Commission, to Hugh Seymour, Hoare & Govett Ltd.,
London, England (Sept. 28, 1973) [hereinafter cited as Romanski Letter] (on file with the Fordham
Law Review); see 15 U.S.C. § 780 (1976). Even if the broker does not recommend specific securities
in the United States, for example, if he only mentions the name of a foreign broker and indicates
that foreign securities may be purchased through that broker, registration would be required if such
conduct could reasonably be viewed as inducing the purchase of securities. Romanski Letter,
supra, at 4. Similarly, conferences conducted in the United States to induce American institutions
or persons to invest abroad also requires broker registration. Id. at 5-6.
145. Administrative Determination No. 51 (Mar. 17, 1938) (on file with the FordhaI Law
Review).
146. Id. at 2. Compare the limitations on the applicability of the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b) (1976), with transactions by foreign subsidiaries of United States
companies. See S. Rep. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 11, reprinted in [1977] U.S. Code Cong. &
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registration application need not include branch offices and corre-
spondents located outside the United States, but must list such branch
offices and agents if they are located within the United States.' 47
Although only this last interpretation has been expressly continued
in effect by the CFTC,148 current policy in this area may nevertheless
be discerned from a CFTC staff interpretation in a related area. In an
interpretative letter issued by the CFTC's Office of General Counsel
(CFTC General Counsel)149 the view was expressed that the CFTC's
authority to prohibit a violator of the CEA from trading on or subject
to the rules of a contract market did not extend to prohibit trading on
exchanges located outside the United States. 1s The letter noted that
the authority to order such a prohibition was comparable to the
authority granted by section 4d of the CEA, which requires registra-
tion of persons soliciting orders for futures contracts on United States
markets.151 Accordingly, under the CFTC General Counsel's analysis
it would appear that solicitation in the United States of futures
contracts for foreign markets does not require registration as a futures
commission merchant. 15 2
Because CFTC regulations exempt from registration persons trading
for proprietary accounts, 153 foreign entities trading on contract mar-
Ad. News 4098, 4108-09; H.R. Rep. No. 831, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14, reprinted in [19771 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 4121, 4125-26; H.R. Rep. No. 640, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 11-12 (1977); 123
Cong. Rec. H12,825-26 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Eckhardt).
147. Administrative Determination No. 219 (May 22, 1969) (on file with the Fordham Law
Review).
148. 17 C.F.R. § 1.11, .14(l) (1979).
149. CFTC Interpretative Letter No. 75-19, reprinted in [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,113 (July 1, 1975). Because the courts may give such interpretations
deference, see note 126 supra, the CFTC General Counsel has stated that "the opinions expressed
by Commission employees do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission itself; they are not
binding upon the Commission, or, indeed, upon the persons who requested and obtained them. Of
course, since the Commission employees have particular expertise concerning the requirements of
the Commodity Exchange Act one would normally expect that an attorney such as yourself would
give due consideration to these opinions when advising [your] clients." CFTC Interpretative Letter
No. 77-17, reprinted in 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) F 20,449 (Oct. 19, 1977). But see Kixmiller
v. SEC, 492 F.2d 641, 644 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
150. CFTC Interpretative Letter No. 75-19, reprinted in [1975-1977 Transfer Binderl Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,113, at 20,813 (July 1, 1975).
151. 7 U.S.C. § 6d (1976).
152. Recognizing the existence of a similar gap, the CFTC adopted a rule that required persons
selling commodity options to register as futures commission merchants. 17 C.F.R. § 32.3 (1979).
This rule was adopted by the CFTC pursuant to its plenary authority to regulate commodity
options. 7 U.S.C. § 6c(b) (1976); see Extraterritorial Implications, supra note 51, at 17 n,29,
153. 17 C.F.R. § 1.7 (1979). Proprietary accounts are broadly defined by CFTC regulations,
and range from those owned by a corporation to those owned by an individual, his spouse, or minor
child. Id. § 1.3(y). See getrally 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) " 20,705 (Dec. 5, 1978).
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kets in the United States need not register as futures commission
merchants if the trading is only for their own or related accounts. 1-4
Exemption from the registration requirement, however, does not pre-
clude application of other requirements of the CEA such as re-
cordkeeping requirements. 15 -
There is a further exemption from registration of foreign entities:
[Tihe CFTC apparently takes the position that a foreign entity which performs all of
the functions of [a futures commission merchant] except that it is located outside the
United States and only has foreign customers is a 'foreign broker' and not [a futures
commission merchant] . ... Foreign brokers are not subject to registration but are
subject to certain reporting requirements .... IS6
2. Segregation Requirements
Prior to the establishment of the CFTC, the Authority concluded
that the segregation provisions of the CEA 15 7 would not apply to
monies held by a futures commission merchant for margin trades on a
Canadian exchange.' 5 8 The Authority similarly determined that the
CEA did not require foreign brokers to comply with provisions relating
to the segregation of margin accounts. i59 Thus, the segregation provi-
sions of the CEA apparently would not be applicable to a foreign
broker soliciting and accepting business only in foreign countries.
Conversely, if the soliciting organization was a foreign branch or a
wholly-owned subsidiary of an American corporation or firm, the
154. CFTC Interpretative Letter No. 75-20, reprinted in [1975o1977 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,119, at 20,847 (Dec. 5, 1975). The CFTC General Counsel concluded that
registration was not required for a domestic subsidiary established by foreign companies to transact
business for the foreign entities on United States contract markets. Id.
155. Id.
156. Extraterritorial Implications, supra note 51, at 15 n.13; see 17 C.F.R. § 15.00(a) (1979).
157. 7 U.S.C. § 6d(2) (1976); 17 C.F.R. § 1.20-.30 (1979). These segregation provisions require
the futures commission merchant to separately maintain and account for customer funds. Id. §
1.20(a). Segregation requirements are also imposed in commodity options transactions including
London commodity options. 17 C.F.R. § 32.6 (1979); see Extraterritorial Implications, supra note
51, at 7. Prior to the CFTC's ban on such transactions, see note 105 supra, these segregation
requirements were upheld in British Am. Commodity Options Corp. v. Bagley, 552 F.2d 482, 490
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 938 (1977). The CEA also provides minimum financial require-
ments for futures commission merchants. 7 U.S.C. § 6f(2) (1976). These have recently been
amended to provide for audits by independent accountants and the contract markets rather than
audits by the CFTC as had previously been the case. 17 C.F.R. § 1.17 (1979); 43 Fed. Reg.
39,956-57 (1978). See generally, Markham, Investigations Under The Commodity Exchange Act, 31
Ad. L. Rev. 285, 293-94 (1979).
158. Administrative Determination No. 20 (Aug. 14, 1937) (on file with the Fordham Law
Review).
159. Administrative Determination No. 51 (Mar. 17, 1938) (on file with the Fordham Law
Review); Administrative Determination No. 37 (Dec. 16, 1937) (on file with the Fordham Law
Review).
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Authority apparently would have applied the segregation require-
ments. 160 In this regard, however, it appears that the Authority has
not been entirely consistent; the Authority also ruled that a futures
commission merchant could not transfer domestically-segregated cus-
tomer funds to its office in a foreign country because the CEA's
segregation provisions would not be applicable to foreign de-
positories. 161
The views expressed by the Authority with respect to segregation
requirements for foreign brokers and foreign branch offices of futures
commission merchants appear to be inconsistent. If such requirements
are applied to branch offices of domestic futures commission mer-
chants, then domestic concerns would be discriminated against in
favor of foreign brokers. It may be argued that this disparity is
necessary to protect the domestic operations of the futures commission
merchants from, for example, the effects of a bankruptcy proceeding.
The Bankruptcy Act, however, now provides specific protection for
segregated funds. 162 Moreover, the purpose of segregation require-
ments is to protect identifiable funds of specific customers. By creating
foreign branches in the form of foreign subsidiaries, domestic futures
commission merchants can isolate their foreign operations.
B. Associated Persons
Employees of futures commission merchants who solicit commodity
futures orders, or supervise the solicitation of such orders, are required
to register with the CFTC as "associated persons. 1 63 Shortly after its
creation, the CFTC adopted a short-form registration procedure for
associated persons who confine their activities to areas outside the
United States.1 64 The CFTC General Counsel noted that in order to
160. Administrative Determination No. 51 (Mar. 17, 1938) (on file with the Fordham Law
Review). See also Administrative Determination No. 57 (Apr. 28, 1938) (on file with the Fordham
Law Review).
161. Administrative Determination No. 238 (Sept. 4, 1974) (on file with the Fordham Law
Review).
162. See White, The Comnntodity-Related Provisions of the Bankruptcy Act of 178., 34 Re".
A.B. City N.Y. 262 (1979).
163. 7 U.S.C. § 6k (1976) An associated person is any person "associated with any futures
commission merchant or with any agent of a futures commission merchant as a partner, officer, or
employee (or any person occupying a similar status or performing similar functions), in any capacity
which involves (i) the solicitation or acceptance of customers' orders (other than in a clerical
capacity) or (ii) the supervision of any person or persons so engaged .... " Id.
164. 17 C.F.R. § 1.10b (1979). Regulation 1.10b was adopted by the CFTC in response to
inquiries concerning whether foreign associated persons who were located outside the United States
and who confined their activities to places outside the United States were required to register The
CFTC stated that the language of CEA § 4k, 7 U.S.C. § 6k (1976). governing requirements for
19791
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qualify for such short-form registration, a foreign associated person
must affirmatively state that his activities are confined to areas outside
the United States, its territories, or possessions. 165 The CFTC General
Counsel's statement was made in response to an inquiry by a registered
futures commission merchant associated with two affiliated foreign
companies, one located in Amsterdam and one in London. Both of the
affiliates were commodity merchants which occasionally accepted and
transmitted foreign customer orders to the United States futures com-
mission merchant for execution on United States contract markets.
The CFTC General Counsel expressed the view that, assuming all
acceptances and transmissions by the employees of the foreign affiliates
take place outside the United States, its territories, or possessions, the
employees of the foreign affiliates would be qualified for the short-form
registration. 166
This action appears to be inconsistent with an earlier Authority
ruling that the registration application of a futures commission mer-
chant need not include information concerning correspondents located
outside the United States.' 67 This ruling also discriminates against
domestic futures commission merchants in favor of foreign brokers.
Because the foreign operations of a futures commission merchant are
essentially the same as that of a foreign broker, such disparity does not
appear to be justified by any actual distinction between the activities of
the two professionals and penalizes domestic futures commission mer-
chants by imposing additional regulatory requirements which a foreign
broker may avoid. Foreign branches of domestic futures commission
merchants and foreign brokers are competitors, and any additional
regulatory burdens on the foreign operations of the futures commission
merchant imposes a discriminatory burden that could impair such
competition. 168
associated persons, appeared sufficiently broad to require registration of such persons; but con-
cluded that because such registration was not practicable in some instances, a short form of
registration was appropriate. The CFTC stated that futures commission merchants are responsible
for transmitting such applications to their foreign associated persons, for renewing the registration,
and for warranting that the information contained in such applications is correct to the best of their
knowledge. Futures commission merchants are also required to inform the CFTC of any termina-
tion of the foreign associated person's employment and the reasons therefore. 40 Fed. Reg. 30,106
(1975).
165. CFTC Interpretative Letter No. 75-12, reprinted in (1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) T 20,099 (Oct. 6, 1975).
167. See note 147 supra and accompanying text.
168. The CEA requires the CFTC to "take into consideration the public interest to be protected
by the antitrust laws and endeavor to take the least anticompetitive means" in adopting regula-
tions. 7 U.S.C. § 19 (1976). Requiring registration of foreign branch offices of futures commission
merchants and not of foreign brokers appears to be inconsistent with this statutory directive.
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C. Commodity Trading Advisers and Commodity Pool Operators
The CEA requires persons acting as commodity trading advisers to
register with the CFTC. 169 In an interpretative letter, the CFTC
General Counsel considered whether a dealer in gold and silver bullion
and other metals who rendered commodity advice to foreign and
domestic manufacturers, institutions, and other dealers was required
to register as a commodity trading adviser. 170 The dealer did not
engage in business with the public generally and did not accept orders
for futures contracts. The CFTC General Counsel concluded that it
would not recommend enforcement action if the firm did not register as
a commodity trading adviser. The CFTC General Counsel noted,
however, that when analyses, comments, recommendations, and pre-
dictions with respect to commodities traded on foreign markets are
made available to the public, registration as a commodity trading
adviser may be required if such advice can be expected to encourage or
discourage futures trading on a contract market in the United
States. 171
Registration may also be required even though the commodity
trading advice is rendered solely to foreign customers. The CFTC
General Counsel concluded that the registration provisions for com-
modity trading advisers in the CEA17 2 and the absence of any contrary
indication in the legislative history suggested that the registration
requirements applied to persons who used "jurisdictional means" to
render commodity trading advice. 173 In other words, in the view of the
CFTC General Counsel, a commodity trading adviser who makes use
of the mails or other instrumentalities of interstate commerce would be
169. 7 U.S.C. § 6n (1976). A commodity trading adviser includes any person who, for compen-
sation or profit, advises others "as to the value of commodities or as to the advisability of trading in
any commodity [futures contracts) ... on or subject to the rules of any contract market" or who, as
part of their regular business, "issues or promulgates analyses or reports concerning commodities."
Id. § 2. Exempted from this definition are, among others: "(i) any bank or trust company, (ii)
any newspaper reporter, newspaper columnist, newspaper editor, lawyer, accountant, or teacher,
(iii) any floor broker or futures commission merchant, (iv) the publisher of any bona fide newspaper,
news magazine, or business or financial publication of general and regular circulation including
their employees." Id. In addition, registration is not required for any commodity trading adviser
who, "during the course of the preceding twelve months, has not furnished commodity trading
advice to more than fifteen persons and who does not hold himself out generally to the public as a
commodity trading adviser." Id. § 6m.
170. CFTC Interpretative Letter No. 76-5, reprinted in [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,147 (Apr. 12, 1976).
171. Id.; see 17 C.F.R. § 4.13(b)(1), (c) (1979).
172. 7 U.S.C. § 6n (1976).
173. CFTC Interpretative Letter No. 76-5, reprinted in 11975-1977 Transfer Binder) Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCII) 20,147, at 20,955 (Apr. 12, 1976).
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required to register even if he were only advising foreign customers. 1 74
The CFTC General Counsel also concluded that a commodity trading
adviser located outside the United States but utilizing jurisdictional
means to render commodity trading advice to United States citizens
would be subject to the registration requirements, even though the
number of United States residents who were receiving this advice was
less than the statutory minimum number of persons required for
registration purposes. 175
Commodity pool operators are also required to register with the
CFTC. 176 The CFTC General Counsel has considered the problem of
whether persons operating a commodity pool outside the United States
are required to register as commodity pool operators. The commodity
pool in question confined its activities to areas outside the United
States. None of the participants were residents or citizens of the United
States, and the funds and other capital in the pool came from foreign
sources. The commodity pool traded through the London office of a
United States futures commission merchant registered with the CFTC,
and trades were executed on both foreign and United States contract
markets. Other persons located outside the United States provided
commodity adviser services on both foreign and United States contract
markets. Under those facts, the CFTC General Counsel concluded
that it would not recommend enforcement action if the persons operat-
ing the commodity pool failed to register as commodity pool operators
or as commodity trading advisers.
177
An unanswered question is whether registration as a commodity
pool operator is required for a United States commodity pool trading in
futures contracts on foreign exchanges. The definition of a commodity
pool operator is limited to a pool "trading in any commodity for fu-
174. Id.
175. CFTC Interpretative Letter No. 76-25, reprinted in [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,239 at 21,276 (Dec. 6, 1976). The CEA exempts a commodity trading
adviser from registration if the adviser is rendering commodity trading advice to less than l5
persons in a one-year period. 7 U.S.C. § 6m (1976). The CFTC General Counsel noted that the
adviser in this case was rendering commodity trading advice to less than 15 persons in the United
States but to over 150 subscribers worldwide. Although the statutory definition of a commodity
trading advisor is directed toward activities on United States contract markets, see note 169 supra,
the CFTC General Counsel nevertheless believed that the minimum of 15 persons should be
measured on a worldwide basis when the jurisdictional means were being used. [1975-1977
Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,239 (Dec. 6, 1976).
176. 7 U.S.C. § 6n (1976). A commodity pool operator is a business which solicits, accepts or
receives from others funds, securities, or property for the purpose of trading in any commodity for
future delivery on or subject to the rules of a contract market. Id. § 2. The CFTC has authority to
exempt persons from this definition, id., and has exercised this authority to a limited extent. 17
C.F.R. § 4.13 (1979).
177. CFTC Interpretative Letter No. 76-21, reprinted in [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm,
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,222 (Aug. 15, 1976).
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ture delivery on or subject to the rules of any contract market."1 78
Because "contract market" is the statutory term for domestic market,
this provision may be interpreted to exclude commodity pools trading
on foreign exchanges from the CEA's registration requirements. If so,
this would conform to the interpretation that a broker soliciting in the
United States only for foreign markets need not register with the
CFTC. 179 In any event, the CFTC's antifraud provisions for foreign
futures contracts sold in the United States would nevertheless apply. 18 0
CONCLUSION
The CFTC policy of "parity of treatment 181 for foreign traders is,
in reality, a misnomer. The distinctive nature of many regulations for
foreign traders simply does not establish a consistent policy of parity of
treatment. Instead, from a review of the proposed and present regula-
tory policies of the CFTC, it appears that the actual policy has been to
establish regulations for foreign traders which allow the CFTC to
achieve its regulatory goals. For example, reporting requirements for
foreign traders are designed to allow the CFTC to maintain surveil-
lance over the trading activities of foreign participants that may have a
substantial impact on United States markets. 1 82 The lack of registra-
tion requirements for foreign brokers, on the other hand, exhibits an
assessment that the regulatory goals sought by registration are not
directed at foreign persons. In both instances, the regulatory goals of
the agency-realpolitik and not a concept of parity of treatment-
established the basis for the CFTC's regulatory policy.
Regardless of the theory used to justify CFTC policies, however, it
is clear, as evidenced by the Wiscope case,' 8 3 that the CFTC intends
to require foreign participants in United States markets to play by
whatever rules the CFTC establishes. Of course, in instituting such
regulations the CFTC must be mindful that it is establishing United
States foreign policy with respect to foreign commercial interests
engaged in commodity trading. The foreign relations of the United
States and the reciprocal treatment of American traders in foreign
markets may be directly affected by CFTC attempts to regulate foreign
traders. The exigencies of international comity, however, do not
militate against regulation of foreign participants. Rather, the CFTC
178. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
179. See note 147 supra and accompanying text.
180. See notes 88-97 supra and accompanying text.
181. See notes 27-29 supra and accompanying text.
182. See notes 42-56 supra and accompanying text.
183. See notes 46-52 supra and accompanying text. Recently the CFTC filed an administra-
tive complaint against a Swiss bank for failing to respond to a special call for information. CFTC
v. Suisse Banque Populaire, No. 80-8 (CFTC, filed Dec. 3, 1979); see CFTC Seeks Ruling
Broadening Disclosures By Foreign Traders, Wall St. J., Dec. 4, 1979, at 39, col. 1.
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must recognize that while its regulatory goals are salutory, it may be
necessary at times to modify its procedures or use alternative measures
to achieve its goals and to accommodate the international community.
As CFTC Commissioner Gartner has noted, the CFTC regulatory
structure cannot ignore "international economic policy and interna-
tional political relations.118 4 At the same time, however, foreign
traders and their governments must recognize the CFTC's mandate to
achieve effective regulation of futures transactions which have an
impact on the economy of the United States.
184. Gartner Address, supra note 28, at 22,824.
